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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
The present study is an initial step in the search for 
clearer understanding of metaphor formation--its underlying 
psychological processes. The creation of metaphor is concep­
tualized as a cognitive activity which both filters perceptual 
and conceptual stimuli and creates, through the medium of 
language, a different interpretation of one's cognitive world. 
It is hypothesized that perception and expression of metaphor 
relate to certain types of cognitive functioning.
It is a singularly human activity to put thought into 
words. We communicate not only by signs and gestures but also 
by a highly complicated symbolic system which transforms ex­
periences into linguistic forms. Language is highly conven­
tional, since conventional usage of meanings and syntax is 
necessary for the communication of pragmatic information. On 
the other hand, language has its unconventional side as well-- 
its growing edge.
Gendlin (1962) states that while language is logical, 
human experiencing is not always equally logical. He speaks 
of human thought as being "supralogical (p. 29)." Whereas 
conventional language tends to dichotomize experience (e.g., 
good vs. bad or right vs. wrong), phenomenal experiencing 
might best be translated into language as "right but not 
wrong" or "good and bad." In other words, it does appear
2that linguistic forms can lessen the impact of unique experi­
encing, making language a limitation of the sensitive and 
aware individual.
But there are also individuals who seem capable of tai­
loring language to fit their needs rather than becoming en­
capsulated by words and sentences which are prefabricated and 
only loosely express personal meaning. Why is it that one 
person may say, "I am most happy and content right now," 
while another might express a similar feeling by exclaiming, 
"I overflow with a sensuous joy in living"? Both individuals 
have put words to personal experience but in quite different 
styles. The latter individual has expressed himself meta­
phorically, and, in so doing, has communicated a different 
kind of meaning. It would seem therefore, that one’s lin­
guistic and phenomenal horizon is broadened or narrowed by 
his ability to capture his supra-logical experiences in a 
personalized and yet highly communicative language. The met­
aphor is one way of facilitating this personalized language.
The present study will examine metaphoric perception and 
expression as a process by which man attempts to know and 
understand his world. Broadly conceived, all thought ex­
pressed in language is metaphoric in that certain perceptions 
and cognitions are selected in lieu of others. People inter­
pret experience and present linguistically a filtering and 
construing of what they consider to be salient information. 
One must attend to and interpret experiences selectively as
3it is manifestly impossible to report all degrees and varie­
ties of stimulation— both sensory and cortical.
Considering metaphor not only as a poet’s tool but also 
as part of the process of language and thought, it makes 
sense to ask what psychological functions facilitate or inhib­
it metaphoric self-expression and perception. Since experi­
ence is always interpreted to one degree or another, then 
what determines if the representation is stated metaphorical­
ly or not?
Review of the Literature
The very fact that so many people from various disci­
plines have shown an interest in metaphor is an indication 
that metaphor is an intriguing phenomenon, but the defini­
tion of metaphor remains unclear. Attempts to define meta­
phor have primarily come from the areas of philosophy, lin­
guistics, and clinical psychology.
From the grammarian's viewpoint (The MacMillan Handbook 
of English, 1960), a metaphor is "a device for talking about 
one thing as if it were something else . . . .  To suggest a 
likeness, while at the same time defining the limit of that 
likeness, is the delicate process of making a metaphor 
(p. 366)." It is suggested that all figurative language can 
be referred to as metaphor. In the field of literature, 
Turbayne (1962) states that the metaphor combines two cate­
gories of meaning and thus creates a new perspective. He
4concludes that metaphor is a psychological creation. Embler 
(1966) defines metaphor rather broadly. Metaphor is a vehi­
cle with which one organizes and sorts his perceptions, and 
it is through metaphor that language is adapted to a chang­
ing world.
Unlike the grammarian or student of literature, 
linguists do not technically recognize the term "metaphor." 
They prefer to speak of non-literal language created by se­
mantic anomaly. To say "man is a human" is a literal state­
ment. To say "man is a bear" is non-literal since calling 
man a bear involves crossing conceptual categories. In 
truth, man is not a member of the bear family. Not all 
anomalies become figures of speech as Osgood's Semantic Dif­
ferential Technique demonstrates. Thus, a "hot day" is a 
literal phrase; a "hot issue" is metaphorical (and anoma­
lous); and the phrase "hot flux" is more likely to be per­
ceived as nonsense (also anomalous).
On the other hand, a number of philosophers see meta­
phor as a real process and have examined its role in the 
communication of meaning. For example Black (1962) speaks 
of the metaphor as the interaction of two ideas, each in­
fluencing the other. "It is two systems of ideas which are 
blended with a metaphor acting as a filter--emphasizing 
certain relation aspects through the exclusion of other 
cognitions (p. 39)." Thus, in the metaphor "man is a bear," 
certain likenesses between men and bears are emphasized:
5roan can be brutish, dangerous, vicious and instinct driven. 
The metaphor, however, does not imply characteristics untrue 
of men, such as seeing man as furry, having claws, or as hav­
ing a long snout. Such differential perceptual ability is 
an interesting human capacity. Black says it is possible 
because the metaphor acts as a filter or screen through which 
some comparisons pass and others do not.
Cassirer (1970) exceeds Black in scope when he states 
that "language is, by its very nature and essence, meta­
phorical. Unable to describe things directly, it resorts 
to indirect modes of description, to ambiguous and equi­
vocal terms (p. 120)." Words are only shadows of the actual 
experience they represent. Not only are all words metaphors, 
but also the creation of fresh metaphors is one method for 
surpassing the limits of categories of thought and their 
linguistic representation.
Royce (1970), building on Cassirer*s views, divides ways 
of "knowing" into three epistemic categories: rationalism,
empiricism, and metaphorism. Respectively these three 
trends in psychological studies are represented as thinking, 
perceiving and symbolizing. Royce sees metaphoric inter­
pretation of events as a conceptualizing process separate 
from rational and empirical modes of communication.
Among psychologists of varying disciplines, there has 
been periodic interest in metaphor--mostly from a theoret­
ical perspective. Stern (1931) stated that the function
6of metaphor is to deemphasize certain comparisons and to 
highlight others, therefore agreeing with Black that meta­
phor acts as a perceptual filter. Stern conceptualized 
metaphor as the association of two common elements and the 
inhibition of other disparate characteristics. Supposedly, 
in the metaphor "man is a bear," man*s brutishness becomes 
associated with that characteristic in the bear while irrel­
evant comparisons are suppressed. How such a selective 
process might operate in relation to other psychological 
functions is not explained, and it would seem that an asso- 
ciationistic explanation is too simple to account for so 
complex a linguistic event. However, Stern does say that 
"the metaphor gives the emotion directly, instead of talking 
of it; it does not describe, but makes us experience 
(p. 307)."
In summary, it would appear that metaphor is not only 
something which sorts and organizes perceptions but also 
something which can mobilize emotional responses. Brown 
(1958) has suggested that ultimately context determines 
whether or not a metaphor has a perceptual and emotional 
effect.
In a thorough review of literature on and related to 
the topic of metaphor, Anderson (1964) attempts to explain 
the psychology of metaphor through the application of vari­
ous cognitive and physiological models. He suggests that 
individuals use metaphor in the process of both cognitively
7structuring their world and reducing a high level of emo­
tional arousal. He cites Bruner (1957) who states that 
people are able to go beyond the data at hand by the unique 
combinations of perceptions made possible by metaphoric 
thought. Berlyne (1960) is cited in reference to the organ­
ism's need for arousal-reduction. Berlyne emphasizes that 
organisms are motivated by tension-reduction. Anderson sug­
gests that organisms seek both reduction and increase of ten­
sion, provided the increase is moderate. He states that, in 
humans, the dual functions of arousal increase and reduction 
is a characteristic of metaphor. The metaphor's novelty and 
appeal induces arousal, while its creation bridges the gap 
between two disparate ideas and this reduces tension. Ander­
son points out that, in Freudian terms, metaphoric language 
provides an acceptable outlet for libidinal discharge.
Review of Metaphor Research
Relatively little research on metaphor has been con­
ducted, and, of the available studies, several treat metaphor 
only in a peripheral fashion. For example, Smith and Raygor 
(1956) found that relatively anxious individuals tend to 
verbalize more uncommon word-association responses than do 
control subjects. Miller and Isard (1963) in a study of 
semantic anomaly, utilized grammatically correct sentences 
("Gadgets simplify work around the house") semantically anom­
alous but syntactically correct sentences ("Gadgets drill 
passengers from the eyes") and random strings of words
8("Between gadgets highways passengers the steal") (p. 220), 
Subjects perceived semantically anomalous sentences through 
"white noise" more easily than they perceived random strings 
of words* Weinreich (1965) speaks of either increasing or 
decreasing ambiguity of meaning through the combinations of 
grammatical structures. Thus, some ambiguities would seem 
metaphorical and poetic while others would be perceived as 
nonsense.
Several studies have utilized metaphor or metaphorical 
devices in investigating other problems, but these studies 
have coincidentally shed some light on the nature of the meta­
phor. Davitz (1969) asked Ss to describe various emotional 
states. From their responses, he derived a listing of 556 
emotional expressions which includes numerous metaphors.
Fagan (1970) has investigated various modes of communication 
of emotional messages and suggests that intellectual intact­
ness or integration is related to the ability to understand 
verbal metaphor as a communication of feeling. Other studies, 
such as Miller (1970), have used metaphorical projective 
devices to elicit the S_*s self-image.
A growing number of studies have investigated metaphor 
more directly. Sterzinger (1913) administered lists of 
metaphoric expressions to subjects and inferred from his 
results that the pleasure in metaphor comes from the forging 
of a new concept. Mawardi (1961) encouraged the use of 
metaphors in the resolution of cognitive impasses. She had
9group leaders facilitate the evocation of feeling states by 
prompting individuals to express themselves in "feeling 
words." She concluded that this procedure evoked metaphors 
which, in turn, suggested creative solutions to group pro­
cess problems.
A study by Knapp (1960) provides some information on 
the behavior of subjects when their task is to indicate met­
aphor preference. He found that on a preference scale from 
1 to 7, Ss demonstrated fairly close agreement on metaphor 
preference. Most metaphors in his sample, drawn from lit­
erature and books of famous quotations, received mid-scale 
ratings with standard deviations ranging typically no more 
than one scale point either way. There were also no sig­
nificant sex differences. In a factor analysis it was re­
vealed that Ss tended to prefer metaphors which reflect 
dynamic activity rather than passive and oceanic expressions.
Koen (1965) approached metaphor using methodology from 
verbal learning studies. He concluded that the context of a 
sentence determines whether the reader will choose a meta­
phorical or literal word to fill a slot. For example: "The
sandpiper ran along the beach leaving a row of tiny 
(marks**6 8 ) san<*»" s°n>e Ss were given with the sen­
tence five literal associates to the word "marks," and 
another group was given metaphorical associates to the word 
"stitches." Ss given metaphorical associates chose the 
metaphorical response "stitches" 8.8 times out of 12 trials.
10
Of course, Koen's design seems to automatically call for 
this conclusion. An even more interesting study would be to 
see which word Ss choose under varying conditions without 
verbal associates present. However, a study by Michael 
(1970), on another level of inquiry, essentially supports 
Koen in stating that certain conditions or contexts must be 
present in order for Ss to perceive a metaphorical meaning 
in an utterance. In general, he states, the perception of 
metaphor is possible if it is capable of being translated by 
a literal equivalent.
Metaphor has also been approached from a developmental 
standpoint. Asch and Nerlove (1960) studied the language 
development of children and found that children first learn 
the literal meaning of a word and then separately learn to 
apply its metaphorical meaning. While the metaphoric usage 
is well learned by age nine, the understanding of the rela­
tionship between the physical term and its metaphoric use 
continues to develop until after age eleven. For example, 
children begin to understand that the word "sweet" can also 
refer to a personal attribute as well as a physical char­
acteristic. Asch and Nerlove call such words "double­
function terms."
Systematic clinical observations have also offered 
interesting information on metaphor. Ehrenwald (1966) 
concludes that a client's use of metaphor is an indication 
of repressed feeling--content of the metaphor is in itself
11
unimportant. In fact, he states that symptoms themselves 
are metaphoric communications of a problem. Lenrow (1966) 
suggests that the creative use of metaphor by therapists 
can unlock growth potential. A client’s metaphors reveal 
his view of life and his assumptions on his role in the 
scheme of things. In this regard, Laffal (1965) analyzes 
the dominant metaphors expressed by therapy clients. Sim- 
kinson (1970), currently completing his dissertation on the 
occurrence of metaphor in psychotherapy, has noted that met­
aphor created between therapist and client is a way of shar­
ing. He sees metaphoric utterances early in therapy as a 
distancing measure on the part of the client, but in later 
stages of therapy, therapist and client share a set of com­
mon experiences which may become expressed more intimately 
and humanly in metaphor. Finally, Ekstein (1966), too, sees 
the metaphor of schizophrenic communication as allowing dis­
tance from intense feeling while still allowing a type of 
communication. The metaphor is generated by primary thought 
process while therapy helps the client to integrate the feel­
ings into secondary levels of thought.
Overall, studies of metaphor indicate that the meta­
phoric image not only arouses emotion (Lenrow, 1966; 
Sterzinger, 1913) but is also a product of emotional arou­
sal (Davitz, 1969; Ehrenwald, 1966; Stern, 1931). Several 
studies (Craddick 6 Miller, 1970; Davitz, 1969; Fagan, 1970; 
Miller, 1970) have used metaphors to study the expression
12
and communication of emotion and self-concept. But studies 
by Koen (1965) and Michael (1970) suggest that metaphors are 
not evocative unless the metaphor is perceived as such.
Thus, contextual variables, such as word associations or 
awareness of the literal antecedent to a metaphoric usage, 
are important. Another contextual variable may be that met­
aphor is not perceived unless the situation in which it oc­
curs in an emotionally involving one.
Studies by Knapp (1960) and Koen (1965) offer some de­
scriptive data on metaphor, indicating that metaphors evoke 
widely differing individual responses and that it is possi­
ble to catalogue various types of metaphor. Koen names five 
conditions which produce metaphor: (1) A physical term used
to describe psychological phenomena ("a green recruit.” ),
(2) transposed psychological terms ("I'll buy that idea."),
(3) a psychological term used to describe physical phenomena 
("The dark clouds promised a storm."), (^) physical terms 
within a given sense modality transposed ("The meadow had a 
hem of daisies."), (5) use of synesthetic physical terms ("He 
wore a loud tie.") (p. 131). Thus, Koen emphasizes that met­
aphor involves the transposition of meaning from one sensory 
mode or dimension to another. This process is essentially 
what Asch and Nerlove (1958) called the "double-function term."
Research on metaphor consists of a relatively small num­
ber of studies, and, at this point, only suggestions of the 
nature of metaphor are available. Theoretical discussions
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of metaphor, however, may offer some hints as to what direc­
tion a study of metaphor might take. Black (1962), Brown 
(1958), Embler (1966) and Stern (1931) generally agree that 
metaphor is a dynamic process which functions as a percep­
tual filter or as a vehicle for adjusting language to chang­
ing needs. In a broader scope, Cassirer (1970) emphasizes 
the metaphorical nature of language, saying that it is human 
to metaphorize experience. That is, we interpret and give 
form to environmental stimulation.
Anderson's theoretical article (1964) on metaphor essen­
tially supports Cassirer and others but lends added clarity 
by discussing metaphor in terms of existing knowledge of 
psychological functions. As stated earlier, Anderson concep­
tualizes metaphor as a cognitive operation which serves to 
both arouse emotion and reduce tension. The production of 
metaphor is evidence of cognitive structuring activity.
What Anderson has realized is that, when those in psycholog­
ical disciplines speak of metaphor as the putting together 
of two ideas to create a new concept, in psychological terms, 
they are talking about a cognitive activity. Stated meta­
phorically, Sterzinger (1913) referred to the cognitive ac­
tivity as "forging" a new concept. But what is this forging 
of a concept like? What is the cognitive activity involved?
Overall, studies of metaphor seem to fall into two 
broad groups: those which study the conditions facilitating
or inhibiting perception of metaphor and those which focus
1H
on the conceptual process underlying expression of metaphor. 
The remainder of this chapter is devoted to forming a theo­
retical explanation of metaphor in an attempt to unite per­
ceptual and expressive aspects of metaphor in terms of a 
cognitive model.
Stated once again, it is generally maintained that form­
ing a metaphor involves a conceptual process of synthesizing 
two or more ideas in such a way as to suggest a certain at­
titude or impression. For example, Mawardi (1961) found 
metaphors useful in resolution of cognitive impasses. Sup­
pose, in a similar manner, an individual was part of an inter­
personal impasse. He might try to verbalize the conflict by 
saying, "It seems to me that we*re building a wall of resent­
ment between us." Following Koen*s (1965) categorization of 
metaphors, the physical property of a wall, applied to the 
realm of a psychological phenomenon, leads one to perceive 
the conflict in a certain manner. That is, the metaphor em­
phasizes the physical and psychological separation and the 
lack of resolution between the two people in conflict. The 
metaphor is saying that, just as a wall divides, so does con­
flict. The cognitive activity involved seems to be one of 
selection of certain physical and psychological properties 
and one of integration of these properties into an image 
which captures how the person felt about the conflict.
Of what might the integration process consist? Cogni­
tive functions have been conceptualized in a number of ways,
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including the perceptual Interpretation of Witkin (1962) or 
as cognitive controls (Garder 6 Moriarity, 1968). One of 
Guilford*s (1967) contribution to the study of cognitive 
activity has been to separate cognitive skills into those 
which are divergent or convergent. According to Guilford, 
convergent intellectual skills involve the synthesizing of 
stimulus information and cataloguing of input into concep­
tual categories--such as tests of abstraction. Divergent 
thinking is that which is involved in creative thinking, 
where ability to be aware of alternative in problem-solving 
is desirable.
The creation of a metaphor may involve both divergent 
and convergent skills. To create the metaphoric image, the 
individual must first be able to select from alternative 
perceptions certain personally relevant dimensions and then 
be able to integrate these percepts into an image. Thus, 
metaphor would seem to be a highly complex function. The 
selection of percepts may be said to arouse emotion in that 
a state of ambiguity roust be tolerated until the image is 
made comprehensible, at which point, a sense of pleasure or 
completion is felt concomitant with the reduction of tension 
and the formation of a personally meaningful image.
Other specific intellectual skills would seem relevant 
to metaphoric thought as well. For instance a person's 
vocabulary might influence the quality of metaphor, or a 
person with a highly differentiated vocabulary might use
16
less metaphor since he possesses numerous concepts for de­
scribing feelings and for encoding experience. Perceptual 
openness and awareness would also seem related to metaphoric 
thinking.
Given that cognitive development may be a matter of 
moving from conceptual undifferentiation to conceptual dif­
ferentiation and integration or the development of conver­
gent and divergent skills or the acquisition of cognitive 
controls, there still remains consideration of the way in 
which the individual makes use of such cognitive functions. 
In terms of a study of metaphor, it might be asked, "Which 
cognitive styles facilitate metaphoric thought and expres­
sion and which styles of conceptualizing tend to make a per­
son speak in highly conventional or stereotypic modes?" If 
metaphor is a cognitive activity of selecting and integra­
ting percepts, concepts and emotional experiences, then 
what factors would engender such complexity and conceptual 
flexibility in a person?
Anderson (1964) took the initial step of calling meta­
phor a cognitive function. Although not particularly con­
cerned with metaphor, the work of Harvey (1961, 1966) in the 
area of cognitive style offers further possibilities of ex­
plicating the cognitive nature of metaphor. Cognitive style 
refers to the way in which individuals interpret environ­
mental stimuli and, since metaphor has been hypothesized as 
a cognitive and interpretive activity, theories of cognitive
17
consistency will be briefly discussed while particular em­
phasis is given to Harvey's investigations.
Beginning with Kelly (1955), theories of cognitive style, 
in part, are an outgrowth of cognitive consistency theories. 
Kelly posited that people give structure and meaning to their 
experiences (perceptual, kinesthetic and cognitive). Individ­
uals organize and selectively interpret stimuli from a myr­
iad of possible interpretations and in accordance with their 
needs. These interpretations or personal hypotheses are 
called cognitive constructs. He further stated that individ­
uals vary in degree of cognitive differentiation in certain 
areas of functioning. Kelly concentrated on interpersonal 
relationships and, with the Role Construct Repertory (REP) 
Test, found that some people possess many constructs about 
other people while some individuals construe personal rela­
tionships with few and global constructs (e.g., "all people 
are good or bad"). Thus people vary in terms of cognitive 
complexity. There have been numerous elaborations on Kelly's 
work, such as Bieri's (1966) investigations of cognitive com­
plexity or Festinger's (1966) dissonance theory.
Cognitive style has been elaborated most comprehensively 
by Harvey (1961, 1963, 1966) in his Conceptual Systems Theory 
(CST). Harvey attempts to interrelate cognitive functions 
with a theory of motivation, a theory of affect, perceptual 
processes, and studies of value orientation. Based on the 
contention that it is human to give structure to experience,
18
Harvey goes on to define the self as that integration of con­
structs which are in the service of maintaining the individ­
ual's necessary level of emotional activation. Not only do 
individuals seek to avoid excessive stimulation, they also 
positively seek to avoid too much boredom. Harvey concludes 
that people who have low levels of activation develop cog­
nitive styles which help the person avoid excessive stimu­
lation or ambiguity. Maintaining the status-quo is necessary. 
However, individuals requiring higher levels of stimulation 
must maintain a more open cognitive system in order to allow 
ambiguity, new awarenesses, and change in the status-quo.
Harvey's model (1966) is also developmentally oriented.
He states that one determinant of an individual's activation 
level is childhood, familial experiences. In brief, he finds 
that children raised in strict, emotionally restrictive and 
punitive homes tend to be more conforming and absolutistic 
than children from permissive environments. Children in per­
missive homes are freer to explore their world and thus tend 
to be more creative and cognitively complex. They are more 
likely to notice the unusual and to incorporate it into an 
ever growing and changing cognitive structure.
In using the term "complexity," Harvey means more than 
the number of cognitive constructs a person maintains on a 
given issue. Harvey (1966) writes of conceptual systems in 
terms of complexity of structure and by "structure," he means 
"the relationship amongst the various parts of a system
19
(p. HO)." These parts are interrelated functionally, and 
change, reorganization or articulation of the parts or sys­
tem processes depends upon resolution of "conflict between 
intra-system tendencies (p. 41)." How the person meets con­
flicting cognitive inputs, tendencies or attitudes is deter­
mined by the level of complexity of his conceptual system.
Harvey states that the complexity of a cognitive system 
is based on a process of differentiation and integration of 
system parts. By "part," it appears he means something like 
a constellation of attitudes or personal constructs on a top­
ic such as "the American way of Life" or "sex" or "marriage." 
When a person encounters deviant attitudinal input, he may 
either ignore it or integrate it into his cognitive structure. 
For example, suppose an individual maintains a set of cogni­
tive constructs on the concept of race. Very gross differ­
entiation of the concept might be revealed by the person's 
statement, "All black people are lazy," or "All black people 
are either faithful or uppity." The concept is of low dif­
ferentiation and complexity because it involves only bifur­
cated evaluation. A more complex concept of race might state 
that "Some blacks are not trustworthy when life experiences 
have taught them to be dishonest, but others may become in­
dividuals of high scruples because they wish to change a poor 
past." This concept is more complex because it involves 
fine differentiations in situations, motivation and intent.
20
Harvey dimensionalizes cognitive•complexity • in terms of 
concreteness--abstractness. The individual who makes bifur­
cated, absolutistic value judgements is concretistic in that 
he forms global, undifferentiated cognitive constructs. The 
absolutism is a way of avoiding the conflict which would be 
experienced from awareness of input deviant to his rather 
inflexible, simplistic view of an issue. More abstract con­
ceptual systems are flexible and can tolerate deviant input 
because the individual relies on numerous cognitive constructs 
or interpretations of experience which transcend the fluc­
tuation of daily events. Deviant input does not threaten a 
drastic change in his world view as it would threaten the 
individual who makes sense out of the environment with only 
a few concrete beliefs.
Harvey also delineates several properties of the di­
mension of concreteness--abstractness:
(1) Clarity--ambiguity: This property refers to the
degree of stimulus discrimination in a cognitive construct. 
"All blacks are lazy" is indicative of poor discrimination 
since it ignores individual differences. Because of its gen­
erality, the statement is ambiguous.
(2) Compartmentalization--interrelatedness: A concept
may be clearly differentiated but not interconnected with 
other concepts in the conceptual system. Many older indig­
enous Southern Americans remember a black nanny with affec­
tion. They knew her as a person who could sometimes scold and
21
sometimes be very loving. Yet, they may equally hate and 
mistrust blacks in general.
(3) Centrality— peripherality: Cognitive structures 
which hinge on one or two main constructs are rigid. They 
are rigid because the individual's self esteem is easily 
threatened if deviant input is allowed. A decentralized 
cognitive system, with the system parts carrying equal im­
portance, is more flexible and stable. Self-esteem is based 
on many cognitive interpretations of experience.
As stated earlier, the degree of complexity of a cogni­
tive system is largely determined by childhood experiences. 
Harvey sees cognitive development naturally progressing from 
a diffuse, global and concretistic structure to one which is 
more differentiated and flexible and less centralized. How­
ever, development can be arrested by environmental influence, 
and Harvey proposes four basic cognitive styles to represent 
levels of development in a conceptual system.
Cognitive level I functioning is equivalent to the most 
simplistic cognitive style. The level I individual tends to 
be concrete in his beliefs and absolutistic in his judgement. 
He is so rigid because his self esteem hinges on several 
highly centralized and undifferentiated cognitive constructs. 
In support, Harvey (1966) finds that level I individuals 
score the lowest on Kelly's REP Test, indicating they main­
tain fewer cognitive constructs than other system types.
This means they have fewer interpretations and explanations
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of other people*s behavior* Level 1 Individuals also are 
found to score highest on measures of dogmatism, authorita­
rianism and rigidity. Perceptually, they score the lowest 
on the Embedded Figures Test and also score lowest on tests 
of creativity. The level X individual tends to say, "All 
people should have a religion" or "Marriage is a sacred vow 
sanctioned by God, and sex should be saved till marriage."
The level I individual comes from a home where diversity of 
opinion is not tolerated. Deviancy is severely punished and 
the child is rewarded for believing as he is told to believe.
The level II individual is in rebellion against level 
I-type values. He is equally absolutistic and judgemental 
but in the opposite direction of the level I person. Both 
level I and II individuals come from restrictive home en­
vironments with the exception that level II individuals have 
experienced erratic and inconsistent parental guidance. Har­
vey finds that level II*s score second lowest on the REP 
Test. Whereas level I*s demonstrated high concern with re­
ligion, level II*s show little concern. They also score very 
low on measures of authoritarianism yet are nearly as dogma­
tic and rigid as level I*s. On the Embedded Figures Test, 
level II1s scored second lowest. The level II person might 
complain, "All American institutions are corrupt."
The level III individual, instead of being excessively 
moralistic or stern, tends to be quite relativistic and 
acquiescent. Yet, he is aware of divergent viewpoints and
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does not judge one as necessarily best. Thus, he is more 
cognitively complex because of greater differentiation and 
decentralization of his conceptual system. The level III 
might be heard saying, "Some people need organized religion 
and other*s don’t— it’s probably an individual matter." The 
level III person comes from a more permissive home but one 
mainly permissive in the area of interpersonal relationships. 
The level III person is impressed more by demonstrations of 
expertise while level I and II individuals either subscribe 
to or rebel against institutional authority. Level Ill's 
are dependent on relationships while level I individuals see 
friendship as a commodity to possess.
Harvey finds that level Ill’s score third highest on 
the REP Test. While level I's scored highest in concern 
with religion and authoritarianism, level Ill’s scord second 
highest. However, level Ill's also score fairly low on dog­
matism and rigidity. Perceptually, level Ill’s score higher 
on the Embedded Figures Test than level I's or II*s. Level 
Ill's also score slightly higher on tests of creativity than 
do level I's.
Level IV individuals are the most cognitively complex 
and most integrated cognitive type. Not only are they aware 
of and acceptant of divergent opinions, they are also will­
ing to state their own beliefs. They tend to be the cogni­
tive level most open to new information and, instead of 
being led by authority or expertise solely, they are able to
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guide their actions by interpreting and evaluating conven­
tional practices in light of their own personally determined 
value system. These individuals come from homes which en­
courage exploration of the environment so that fine differ­
entiation of cognitive structures is allowed. The level IV 
person might say, "The American way of life is something not 
to crow about but to enjoy quietly and improve slowly where 
possible." Harvey finds that the level IV person scores 
highest on the REP Test. He scores lowest on measures of 
dogmatism, authoritarianism, and rigidity. He scores high­
est on the Embedded Figures Test and on tests of creativity.
At least one criticism of Harvey’s system is also a 
criticism of all cognitive theories. The term "cognition” 
has almost as many meanings as there are research devices 
to measure cognitive activity. Perceptual studies of cog­
nition speak of field dependence (e.g., Fiebert, 1967).
Other studies speak of conceptual differentiation--integra- 
tion (Gardner 6 Moriarity, 1968). Cognitive consistency
theories are based on complexity or dissonance, so that there
\
is no unified theory of cognition. Considering the multi­
plicity of constructs, it is to Harvey’s credit that he has 
formulated a comprehensive model of cognitive functions and 
cognitive style which has the heuristic value of suggesting 
many research possibilities.
Returning to the area of metaphor, there are a number 
of instances where Harvey's theorizing shares close conceptual
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proximity to previous discussions of metaphor. Harvey has 
found that the cognitively complex person is more open to 
the ambiguities of human experiencing. He is more likely to 
confront the contradictions of life and attempt to inte­
grate these into a cognitive structure. The simplex person 
ignores--perceptually and cognitively--contradictions and 
fits his experiences into fewer and less differentiated cog­
nitive constructs. He tends towards expression of general­
ities and superficialities.
Earlier, metaphor was defined as a process of selection 
of personally relevant percepts and integration of these 
into an image. In a cognitive system of relatively gross 
differentiation and integration of stimuli, metaphor 
would seem unlikely to occur. In the first place, metaphor 
would not be needed, since the individual relies on sim­
plistic and narrow categorizations of experience. Subtle­
ties of experience are ignored and thus the individual would 
not need a creative language to encode such information. 
Furthermore, it has been suggested that metaphor creates am­
biguity in its attempt to create a conceptual category. In 
the metaphor, ’’man is a bear," the expression is somewhat 
ambiguous in that it both suggests likenesses between men 
and bears, and yet the reader knows that the statement is not 
to be taken wholly literally. The cognitively simplex indi­
vidual, such as a level I type, should be intolerant of such 
ambiguity because of his rigid cognitive structure and
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because of his tendency to categorize absolutistically. To 
the level I, man cannot both be like a bear and unlike 
bear. Probably, this last statement is an exaggeration of 
the level I mentality, but it is made to express a stereotype, 
which is what each of Harvey's four cognitive styles is.
In a complex conceptual system with greater differentia­
tion and integration of parts and more flexibility, stimulus 
ambiguity is more easily tolerated and more often encountered. 
For example, the level IV individual more often will encounter 
experiences which do not neatly fit existing conceptual cate­
gories. To account for deviant input, he must transcend 
categories and create new constructs to integrate information  ^
into his cognitive structure. To say that "man is a bear" is 
a complicated expression, but it is likely an expressive tool 
available to the level IV person since he can better tolerate 
its ambiguity. The level IV is more likely to use metaphor 
because he has more cognitive constructs which he can juxta­
pose and integrate into an image which suggests a new inter­
pretation of experience.
The present study is an attempt to test several hypo­
theses to determine how cognitive skills (intelligence) and 
cognitive style (via CST) are related to perceptual and ex­
pressive preference for metaphor. Intelligence level was 
measured by use of the Shipley-Hartford Scale, and cognitive 
style was determined by use of Harvey's TIB. In choosing 
cognitive styles for the study's groups, cognitive level Ill's
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were used instead of the level IV type. As discussed in more 
detail in Chapter II, level IV*s occur quite infrequently in 
the population, but level Ill's comprise roughly 20% of the 
sample. To investigate perceptual preference for metaphor, 
a Metaphor Preference Schedule (MPS) was constructed. The 
MPS is a paper-and-pencil task in which a £  chooses what he 
considers to be the best expression of feeling--either a 
metaphor or a literal item. To explore expressive preference 
for metaphor, Ss were also asked to write a Peak Experience 
Essay. Both the MPS and the Peak Experience Essay are ex­
plained in detail in Chapter II.
The following hypotheses are proposed.
1. Cognitive level III Ss will score higher on the 
Metaphor Preference Schedule than will cognitive level I Ss.
It has been stated that the more complex a person's 
cognitive style, the more he should prefer metaphorical ex­
pressions. Harvey has stated that cognitive style III in­
dividuals have construct systems which are more highly dif­
ferentiated and integrated than those of cognitive style I 
individuals. That is, level III persons utilize a greater 
number of constructs in explaining situations or maintaining 
beliefs, and their self-concept and self-esteem do not hinge 
on maintaining a few key concepts. Deviant input to their 
construct system or ambiguity in constructs can be tolerated 
because the self is composed of many constructs. Level Ill's 
not only can tolerate the ambiguity of metaphor but they also
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should more often require metaphor as a means of resolving 
conflict among constructs than would level I individuals.
2. Higher IQ Ss will score higher on the MPS than will 
lower IQ Ss.
The possible role of intelligence level in metaphor 
preference has been presented. In general, the higher an 
individual’s level of intelligence, the more likely he is to 
prefer metaphorical expressions. While cognitive style de­
pends upon the extensiveness of conceptual differentiation 
and integration in maintaining a self-system, the ability to 
differentiate and integrate stimulus input is an intellectual 
function. The more proficient an individual is at differen­
tiating and integrating stimulus information, the better he 
is at recognizing complex verbal stimuli such as metaphor.
The MPS asks Ss to choose the expression most communicative 
of emotional meaning and, assuming that metaphor is the best 
communication of feeling, bright Ss should choose metaphor 
more than Ss of lower intellectual level.
3. There will be an interaction between IQ and cogni­
tive style in S. performance on the MPS.
Hypotheses 1 and 2 imply that cognitive level III, high 
IQ Ss will score the highest on the MPS.
**• — 3 scores on the MPS will correlate positively with
their scores on the Peak Experience Essay.
Exploring the relationship of perception and expression 
of metaphor involves two dependent measures of metaphor
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preference. As a starting point for exploration, it is 
assumed that there will be a positive correlation between £  
performance on the MPS and £  performance on the Peak Experi­
ence Essay. That is, if a S perceives metaphors as the best 
expression of feelings, he should also use metaphor in de­
scribing the emotional nature of his peak experience.
5. Higher IQ, cognitive level III Ss will demonstrate 
the highest positive correlation between MPS scores and 
Peak Experience Essay ratings.
Since it is suggested in hypotheses 1 and 2 that high 
IQ, cognitive level III Ss will score the highest on the MPS, 




The first step in the study involved constructing the 
MPS, in order to determine whether or not perception of 
metaphors, as measured by a paper-and-pencil task, is mean­
ingfully related to the independent variables. Initially, £  
collected a number of phrases or sentences thought to be 
either examples of metaphorical or non-metaphorical emotional 
expressions. The majority of items were selected from 
Davitz's (1969) research on the communication of emotional 
meaning. For example, a representative metaphorical expres­
sion was "I feel sure, accomplished, happy.” Additional 
items were collected by E_, with obvious cliches being ex­
cluded. A listing of cliche and non-cliche phrases provided 
by Lindauer (1968) served as a guide for excluding such well- 
known expressions.
Ten graduate students in English were given a list of 
80 items--40 of which £  had previously judged as metaphors 
and 40 of which he judged as literal expressions. Judges 
were instructed to define metaphor broadly, including any 
expression which they thought should not be interpreted at 
face value. The judges' task was to judge each item as meta­
phorical or literal. Of the 80 items, 59 received 80% agree­
ment among the judges. Eighty percent agreement was estab­
lished as a reasonable cut-off point, in that lower
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percentages of agreement would be too close to chance. Of 
the 59 items receiving 80% or better agreement, 30 expres­
sions obtained 100% consensus as to whether or not they were 
metaphors or literals; of those 30 items, 14 were metaphors.
From the 59 items, £  selected 19 metaphors and 19 lit­
eral expressions to construct a preliminary MPS. Twenty-one 
items were discarded for various reasons: according to IE's
judgement, some expressions contained very negative content 
("My brain is just a jungle of junk.") while others were con­
sidered by E to be too close to sounding cliche. ("There's 
a lump in my throat.") In selecting the 38 items, £  at­
tempted to roughly match metaphorical expressions with lit­
eral equivalents. Thus, one metaphor, "There is an inner, 
warm glow," had a literal counterpart, "There's a sense of 
intense well-being." There was also an attempt to maintain 
a balance between emotionally positive and negative expres­
sions •
Each of twelve positive metaphors was paired with each 
of twelve positive literal items, giving 144 paired compar­
isons of positive emotion expressions. In a separate section 
of the MPS, each of seven negative metaphors was paired with 
each of seven negative literal items, yielding 49 paired com­
parisons of negative emotion expressions. These 193 items 
were collected into booklet form.
Seventeen females and 10 males in a sophomore Introduc­
tory Psychology class were asked to choose the expression in
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each pair of items which they preferred as a way of expres­
sing oneself. One week later, the Ss were retested. Relia­
bility coefficients were calculated for each item on the 
schedule. Moderate correlations were expected since meta­
phor seems to be related to emotional arousal, and thus some 
variability would seem reasonable. In fact, coefficients 
ranged from . to .92 (see Appendix 1), all significant at 
the .05 level of confidence. The test-retest coefficient 
for the total scores was .71. Upon retest, Ss were asked to 
indicate how much boredom they experienced with the large 
number of forced-choice items and how much they relied on 
memory of the first testing. On a seven-point scale, S_s 
indicated low to moderate boredom and moderate recall.
Thus, the reliability coefficients seem to be reasonably 
reflective of the stability of test items.
Another class of Introductory Psychology students was 
given the preliminary MPS items and asked to rate each on 
the following dimensions: originality of the expression,
effectiveness of the expression in communicating meaning, 
personal preference for the item, and degree to which the 
item personally described the rater. All dimensions were 
rated on a five-point scale, "one” meaning a low rating and 
"five" meaning a high rating. Responses were grouped by age 
in order to control for the possible effects of age in­
creases on metaphor preference patterns. The 26 raters
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ranged in age from 18 to 50 years (Mean Age = 27.5). Table 1 
gives the median ratings for the items. Upon inspection of 
Table 1, it can be seen that there is little difference be­
tween age groups in regard to median ratings for the items.
In the final revision of the MPS (see Appendix 2), eight 
metaphors and eight literal expressions were selected and 
roughly matched in terms of the dimensions discussed above. 
Only positive metaphors were paired with positive literal 
items and only negative metaphors were paired with negative 
literal items, but negative pairings were not placed in a 
separate section. All pairs were randomly distributed. The 
revised MPS thus consists of 32 paired-comparisons. The £  
is asked to choose the expression in each pair which he 
thinks best communicates feelings. An MPS example pair,
"(a.) want to hold back time and capture the moment or (b.)
I feel sure, accomplished, happy," was presented in the in­
structions. Since the items are those which judges consid­
ered neither particularly trite nor unusually original, the 
S*s choice between a metaphor or literal items should be 
largely determined by the personal appeal of the expression 
itself. In view of the 32 paired-comparisons, a metaphor 
preference score of 0 to 32 is possible, a score of 32 indi­
cating strong metaphor preference.
The second dependent measure, used to generate metaphor 
in Ss, is the Peak Experience Essay (see Appendix 3). Ss 
were asked to write a brief paragraph describing an
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TABLE 1 











Over 30 3 4 3 3 7
23-30 3 3 3 2 10
18-22 3 3 3 3 9
Negative Items
Over 30 3 3 3 1 7
23-30 3 3 2 2 10
18-22 2 3 3 2 9
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emotionally significant event in their life, thus indicating 
in a written task their expressive preference for metaphor.
The peak experience was taken as an index of the S^ 's 
ability to express himself metaphorically, based on Maslow's 
discussion of the nature of peak experiences. Maslow (1956) 
stated that the peak experience is a cognitive process, and 
the genuine peak experience evidences what he calls B-cog- 
nition. B-cognition is a perceptual-conceptual process in 
which the usual modes of conceptualizing objects are set 
aside and persons, events, or places are seen in a new per­
spective. In B-cognition, an object is valued for itself.
In B-cognition, the typical dichotomies of language and 
thought are transcended and the person perceives himself at 
one with his world. Maslow further contrasts B-cognition to 
D-cognition, which is the instrumental conceptual process. 
D-cognition catalogues experience into the usual and prag­
matic categories of meaning. Objects are not valued for 
themselves but are given a label and class and are perceived 
only as such. B-cognition leads one to see the fresh and 
unusual in life, much like a drug experience may cause one 
to perceive and cognize events in novel ways. B-cognizers 
are conceptually flexible and emotionally open to new ways 
of perceiving. They are simultaneously able to abstract 
without giving up concreteness.
Maslow’s description of B-cognition is strikingly sim­
ilar to the definition of metaphor as a cognitive activity.
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Both B-cognition and metaphor are complex cognitive processes 
requiring ability to both abstract and integrate percepts 
into a communicable image. Both B-cognition and metaphor 
lead one to discover novel ways of interpreting events.
Thus, the rated level of a £3's peak experience was used as 
an indicator of his ability to express himself metaphor­
ically, since to express a transcendent experience requires 
transcendent language.
To assess intelligence, using a quick-scoring intelli­
gence test, the Shipley-Hartf ord Scale (19 *+ 0 ) was chosen.
The Shipley was originally developed as a measure of cogni­
tive inefficiency due to the effects of various behavior 
disorders: psychoses, neuroses, brain-damage. It consists
of a multiple choice vocabulary test and an abstraction test. 
On the abstraction test, £s must determine the logic in a 
series of numbers, letters, or words and provide the next 
logical response in the sequence. Each subtest is loosely 
timed with as much as ten minutes allowed for each test. 
Although originally devised to detect intellectual impair­
ment, it also yields an estimate of present level of intel­
lectual functioning (Wright, 19H6).
Paulson and Lin (1970) report a correlation of .78 be­
tween the Shipley and the WAIS, thus supporting other studies 
of the Shipley's correlation with other intelligence meas­
ures. They also support the general finding that the 
Shipley is a good estimator of intelligence level for Ss
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with average and above average intelligence. In more extreme 
intelligence levels, Shipley scores become unreliable.
The second independent factor hypothesized to be related 
to metaphor behavior is cognitive style. The measure of cog­
nitive style in the present study was Harvey’s This I Believe 
(TIB) Test. It consists of a page of instructions, followed 
by nine pages in booklet form. Each page begins with the
caption, "This I believe about ________ " which is followed by
one of nine topics: people, the American way of life, reli­
gion, marriage, myself, sin, friendship, immortality and 
compromise. In the present study, the topic of "sex" was 
substituted for "compromise." The TIB instructions are as 
follows:
In the following pages you will be asked to 
write your opinions or beliefs about several top­
ics. Please write at least two (2) sentences 
about each topic. You will be timed on each top­
ic at a pace that will make it necessary for you 
to work rapidly. Be sure to write what you gen­
uinely believe. You must write on the topics in 
the order of their appearance. Wait to turn each 
page until the experimenter gives the signal.
And once you have turned a page, do NOT turn back 
to it. PLEASE DO NOT OPEN THIS BOOKLET UNTIL YOU 
ARE INSTRUCTED TO BEGIN.
The TIB includes extensive scoring criteria and sample 
responses. The S_'s response to each topic is judged on the 
basis of whether it is a cognitive level I, II, III, or IV 
type statement. If six out of nine topics are scored as 
representing one level, then the person is classed as that 
cognitive style. In cases where no cognitive level dominates
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a S's responses, the protocol is scored as a mixed type. 
Common mixed types are I-II or I-III mixes.
Extensive research with the TIB, as surveyed and re­
ported by Greaves (1970), indicates that the TIB does dif­
ferentiate individuals along various dimensions such as de­
gree of authoritarianism, dogmatism, cognitive complexity 
and rigidity. Although scoring criteria are complex and 
difficult to apply at times, high inter-scorer reliability 
is not difficult to achieve.
After selection and construction of the various inde­
pendent and dependent measures, a testing procedure was de­
veloped. Initially, 192 Ss were given a battery of items 
including the instruments of the present study. Sjs were 
tested in groups ranging in size from 4 to 25 persons. The 
testing procedure generally required 60 to 75 minutes. Each 
item in a S*s battery was identified only by social security 
number, age and sex, and tests were administered in the fol­
lowing order: the Metaphor Preference Schedule, the Shipley
Scale, the This I Believe Test and finally the Peak Exper­
ience Essay. In addition, the A-B Scale was added to the 
battery as a dummy measure to insure that Ss did not guess 
the rationale behind the test measures. The sequence of 
tests was arranged to avoid any order effects or other ex­
traneous factors. Testing in large numbers progressed 
smoothly, and most Sjs seemed to reasonably enjoy the several 
tasks.
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In the present study, Shipley total raw scores were 
converted to estimated WAIS verbal IQ's by means of the re­
gression equation, Y' = (verbal + abstraction score)
(1.0586) + 61.176U (Smith, 1971). All the This I Believe 
protocols were next scored by E. An inter-scorer reliabil­
ity estimate was obtained by submitting a sample of 25 TIB's 
(randomly selected) to another graduate student with exper­
ience in scoring the measure. The second scorer did not 
have prior knowledge of the distribution of cognitive style 
levels in the sample of 25 protocols. In an initial com­
parison of agreement between the two sets of scorings, 80% 
agreement was achieved. Of the five disagreements, three 
were due to simple arithmetic or scoring errors,* thus rais­
ing agreement to 92%. On the remaining two disagreements,
E and the second judge reviewed scoring criteria for TIB*s. 
It was discovered that these two were protocols scored when 
E^  was still learning the criteria and had mistakenly not 
been rescored at a later time. Thus, reliability was raised 
to 100%.
All Peak Experience Essays were also rated first by 
Essays received a score from one to five, with "one" meaning 
trite and "five" meaning a genuine peak experience. Scoring 
criteria were developed at Georgia State University by 
Breed (196U) and are reported in Appendix
E rated the essays without knowledge of the Ss' cogni­
tive style. However, to insure against any possible
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experimenter bias and to establish inter-scorer reliability, 
a random sample of 20 peak experiences were selected and 
given to an English graduate student interested in the psy­
chological aspects of language. The English student was 
given ten practice essays, and both E_ and the second judge 
discussed any ambiguities concerning the peak experience 
scoring criteria. Although the graduate student knew the 
the research concerned metaphor, he was not aware of the re­
lationship of the essays to the total study. The degree of 
correlation between £  and the second judge’s ratings was 
.68 (significant at the .001 level with t = 4.73, df = 26).
From the pool of 192 S s , the test results of 60 Ss 
were selected to satisfy the requirements of the study's 
design. Selection of the 60 Ss was guided by several prac­
tical considerations and some limitations imposed by the 
independent measures. First, even though 192 Ss were test­
ed, only 29 Ss were found to represent cognitive level III 
(15%). There were also 100 cognitive level I's (52%), 
three level II’s (2%), one level IV (1%) and 59 mixed level 
types (30%). The distribution of cognitive levels in the 
study's sample is somewhat different from the distribution 
reported by Harvey (1966). Out of 1400 Sjs tested at the 
University of Colorado, he reports 30% were level I's, 15% 
were level II's, 20% were level Ill's, 7% were level IV's 
and 28% were mixed types. However, in a sample of Georgia 
State University students in Introductory Psychology
mclasses, Greaves (1970) reports a distribution roughly equiv­
alent to that of the present sample. Thus, Georgia State 
students seem to be predominantly level I or mixed types.
Since the group of cognitive level III Ss had to be 
divided between two intelligence levels, the N_ for each 
group was set at 15. The one cognitive level IV S_ was added 
to the cognitive level III group. For the sample of cogni­
tive level I S s , high and low IQ scores were chosen to match 
the two IQ groups of cognitive level Ill's on the basis of 
mean IQ scores. Tables 2 and 3 present a further descrip­
tion of the sample.
The sample of 60 S s , 32 females and 28 males, was com­
posed of students from classes at Georgia State University, 
West Georgia College and Oxford College. Thirty-four Ss 
from Introductory Psychology classes and 9 Ss from intro­
ductory and upper division philosophy courses came from 
Georgia State. Fourteen Ss came from West Georgia College, 
some of whom were in Introductory Psychology and some of 
whom were in advanced courses. Three Ss came from Oxford 
College. In addition to meeting the requirements of the 
independent variables, an attempt was made to equally rep­
resent both sexes and to roughly match mean ages across 
groups.
The study's design is as follows: hypothesis 1, 2 and
3 were tested by means of a 2 x 2 factorial analysis of var­
iance, fixed effects model (Edwards, 1966), with IQ scores
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Mean Estimated WAIS Verbal IQ Scores for Low and High 




Low IQ High IQ
Females 






Mean 105.63 114.50 108.14 115.57 106.80 115.00
SD 3.60 1.87 1.46 .73 3.08 1.55
III
Mean 108.00 115.75 110.29 114.02 109.10 115.10
SD 4.21 . 83 1.67 1.47 3.47 1.39
I and III
Mean 106.81 114.92 109.21 115.11 107.93 115.03
SD 4.10 1.71 1.90 1.29 3.47 1.47
estimated from the Shipley test scores and cognitive style 
level as the independent factors. The two levels of each 
factor were low and high estimated IQ scores for the first 
factor and cognitive levels I and III for the second factor. 
The dependent variable was MPS scores.
Hypotheses 4 and 5 were tested by use of the correla­
tion ratio (Bruning 6 Kintz, 1968) in which MPS scores were 
correlated with Peak Experience Essay scores. For all hy­




The mean MPS scores for the low and high TQ groups of 
cognitive level I and level III Ss and of the low and high 
IQ groups for both cognitive levels combined is presented in 
Table *♦, To investigate the first three hypotheses postu­
lated in this study, a 2 x 2 (level x IQ) analysis of vari­
ance was computed. This analysis, shown in Table 5, shows 
intelligence as the only significant main factor with no 
interaction effect. Thus, hypothesis 1, stating that cogni­
tive level III £3s would score higher on the MPS than cognitive 
level I Ss, was not supported. High IQ Ss scored signifi­
cantly higher on the MPS than did low IQ S s , thus supporting 
hypothesis 2 at the .05 level of confidence. Hypothesis 3, 
that there would be an interaction between intelligence level 
and cognitive style, was not supported.
Since intelligence level was found to be significantly 
related to mean MPS scores, the extent of this relationship 
was more thoroughly explored by correlating IQ and MPS scores 
for each group and for the total N. Table 6 presents the 
various coefficients which were all found to be non-signifi­
cant. Thus, while high IQ Ss scored significantly higher on 
the MPS than did low IQ Sjs, it cannot be said that the higher 
a S's level of intelligence, the greater his preference for 
MPS metaphor.
TABLE 4
Mean Scores on the MPS
Cognitive




Mean 14.27 17.53 15.90
SD 5.25 3.63 4. 80
III
Mean 14.93 16.67 15. 80
SD 5. 72 4.98 5.43
I and III
Mean 14. 60 17.10 15. 85
SD 5. 50 4.38 5.12
Note.--The variances were tested and found homogeneous.
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TABLE 5
Summary of Analysis of Variance of the MPS Scores 
(Cognitive Style X IQ)
Source df MS F
Cognitive Style 1 .150 .006
IQ 1 94.350 4.356*
Style X IQ 1 8.216 . 379
Error 56 1472.933
*p < . 0 5
TABLE 6
Pearson Coefficients of Correlation Between 
IQ and MPS Scores
Leve 1 I Leve 1 III Level I and III
Low IQ High IQ Low IQ High IQ Low and High IQ
(N = 15) (N = 15) (N = 15) (N = 15) (N s 60)
• 14 .02 .12 .13 .20
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The mean MPS score for Ss under each Peak Experience 
Essay rating is presented in Table 7 by group and for the 
total N. It is noted by inspection of the means in Table 7 
that the relationship between MPS scores and peak experi­
ence ratings appears to be non-linear in each group, with 
the exception of the low IQ cognitive level I group. In this 
group, there appears to be no relationship between perform­
ances on the two dependent measures. However, there is a 
clear trend between groups for essay ratings to rise as in­
telligence and cognitive levels increase.
This trend is seen more clearly in Table 8, which pre­
sents the frequencies of each essay rating obtained by each 
cognitive level group. As seen in Table 8, there is a 
tendency for cognitive level III Ss to score toward the 
upper end of the rating scale and for cognitive level I Ss 
to score toward the scale's lower end. It is suggested 
that cognitive level III Ss reported more experiences of a 
transcendent nature and utilized more metaphorical imagery 
than did cognitive level I Ss. Level I's tended to report 
common or trite experiences and thus expressed themselves in 
conventional language and dead metaphor.
To investigate the fourth hypothesis, that MPS scores 
would bear an overall positive relationship to peak experi­
ence essay scores, correlation ratios (Nyx) were calculated 
and are presented in Table 9. None of the correlation 
ratios in Table 9 reached the .05 level of significance.
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TABLE 7
Mean MPS Score for Each Peak Experience Rating
Mean MPS Score
















1 2 14.5 2 14. 5 0 - 0 mm 0
2 14 17.6 5 14.6 7 19. 6 2 20.5 0
3 32 15.1 7 14. 7 6 15. 5 8 13.0 11 17.6
4 8 16.6 0 - 1 15.0 4 18. 3 3 11.7
5 1 12.0 0 - 0 - 0 - 1 12.0
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TABLE 8





1 2 3 U 5
I (N = 28) 2 12 13 1 0
III (N = 29) 0 2 19 7 1
Note*--Three Ss did not write scorable essays.
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TABLE 9
Correlation Ratios (Nyx) Between S s * MPS and 
Peak Experience Essay Scores
Cognitive




III . 57 .32
I and III .26
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Thus, hypothesis «+ is not supported. Similarly, hypothesis 
5, which states that cognitive level III high IQ Ss would 
achieve the highest positive correlation, is also not sup­
ported.
The lack of relationship between MPS preference and 
essay ratings raises the question of how Ss performed on the 
essay task differently from their performance on the MPS.
To answer this question, the median essay rating for each 
group was computed and is presented in Table 10. Tests for 
significant differences were performed by use of the Median 
Test (Siegle, 1956). For N/s under 20, the Median Test must 
be completed by use of Fischer's Exact Probability Test. As 
a group, cognitive level III Ss achieved a median rating 
(mdn. = 2) demonstrated by cognitive level I S^ s. There were, 
however, no median differences between the low and high IQ 
groups. Although intelligence was the significant factor in 
MPS preference, cognitive style became the dominant factor 
in essay performance.
It became apparent at this point in the study that the 
estimated IQ scores may be too crude a measure of intelli­
gence, especially since metaphors are complex expressions. 
Subsequently, to further explore possible reasons for the 
lack of correlation between intelligence and metaphor pref­
erence, MPS scores were correlated with raw scores from the 
Shipley's Vocabulary Test, Analogies Test and the total raw 
scores for each cognitive style and intelligence level.
5U
TABLE 10
Median Ratings on Peak Experience Essays
Cognitive
Style Low IQ High IQ
Low and 
High IQ
I 2 2 2
III 3 3 3
I and III 3 3 3
Note.--Median test on ratings between levels I and III 
yielded p = .01.
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Separating the Shipley total score into its two component 
parts should permit the investigation of a s metaphor pref­
erence in relation to not only extent of vocabulary but also 
extent of analogical-conceptual ability. Assuming that 
solution of analogies measures the more complex differentia- 
tion-integration aspects of intelligence, analogical ability 
may be a more discriminating variable for the hypotheses 
generated in this study than simply the total raw score or 
vocabulary scores only.
Means and standard deviations for the Shipley subtests 
and total raw scores are presented in Table 11. Correlations 
computed between these raw scores and MPS scores are shown in 
Table 12. As seen in Table 12, among level I Sjs , regardless 
of intelligence level, vocabulary correlated positively and 
significantly (p <£ .01) with metaphor preference but analo­
gies did not. Conversely, among level III S s , it was analo­
gical ability which correlated significantly but negatively 
with MPS scores, and there was no significant relationship 
between vocabulary and metaphor preference. Thus, the above 
analysis indicates that hypothesis 1 again failed to be 
supported. In fact, level III analogical skill was negative­
ly related to MPS scores. Also, in view of the above results, 
the support of hypothesis 2, which stated that high IQ Ss 
would score significantly higher on the MPS than low IQ Ss, 
cannot be considered conclusive. Finally, although there was 
a lack of interaction between intelligence level and cognitive
TABLE 11
Means and Standard Deviations of Shipley Vocabulary, 











Me an 27.40 27.87 55.27 32.93 34.80 67.73 30.17 31.33 61.50
SD 2.39 3.90 3.53 1.88 2.29 1.57 3.50 4.71 6.81
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 30 30 30
III
Mean 29.60 29.33 58.93 35.00 34.13 67.73 32.30 31.73 64.03
SD 2.68 4.54 5.20 2.61 2.58 1.57 3.78 4.45 6.51
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 30 30 30
I and III
Mean 28.50 28.60 57.10 33.97 34.47 68.43 31.23 31.53 62.77
SD 2.77 4.29 4.81 2.50 2.46 2.15 3.80 4.57 6.78




Pearson Coefficients of Correlation Between HPS Scores and Shipley 











r .32 .26 .50* .39 -.10 .32 .47** .35 .48**
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 30 30 30
III




15 15 15 15 15 15 30 30 30
r .24 -.25 -.08 .10 -.29 -.21 . 30** -.03 .15





style, the correlations in Table 12 suggest a possible inter­
action of the type of cognitive skill with the SJ s cognitive 
style in relation to MPS preference. The use of a global 
intelligence measure may have obscured sources of variance 
which could be partitioned out with measures of specific 
cognitive abilities.
In light of the further analysis of intelligence level 
and MPS preference and its consequence to this study, it was 
decided that further investigation of the assumption that 
the Peak Experience Essay is in fact a measure of metaphor 
expression seemed necessary. It was assumed earlier that a 
S will need metaphor to express a peak experience. Thus, the 
more transcendent the personfs experience, the more he will 
use metaphorical expressions. To explore this assumption, 
the Peak Experience Essays were rated for poetic quality of 
metaphor. A Psychology graduate student, who is interested 
in poetry in psychotherapy, was asked to rate each essay on a 
scale from one to five, with "one" meaning a cliche and mun­
dane written style and "five" meaning an original, imaginative 
and poetic written style. Her ratings were correlated with 
E's original ratings on level of peak experience, and the 
Pearson coefficient of correlation obtained was .52 ( p < .005). 
Inter-judge reliability was obtained by asking an English 
graduate student, who writes poetry, to rate a random sample 
of 25 essays on their poetic quality. The inter-judge reli­
ability coefficient was computed to be .57 (p< .005). A
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correlation of .52, as well as the inter-judge coefficient of 
.57, is acceptable, considering the vagueness of rating 
"poetic quality" of the metaphor in the essays.
In summary, the additional analyses of the study’s data 
indicate:
1. that there are differences in the way level I Ss and 
level III Ss view input data, i.e., the MPS. That is, the 
higher the level Ill's ability to solve analogies, the less 
he demonstrates preference for MPS metaphor. However, level
I Ss apparently prefer MPS metaphor more as vocabulary in­
creases. This suggests that the level I positive correlation 
is due to a common factor, such as reading skill, between the 
vocabulary test and the MPS.
2. that the Peak Experience Essay task does in fact 
reflect the expression (output) of metaphor as previously 
assumed. Furthermore, the data suggest that rating of as 
complex a dimension as "poetic quality of metaphor" can be 
achieved at a significant level of reliability. The initial 
finding that level III Ss express themselves more metaphor­
ically than level I ’s is supported.
CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION
The results of the present study are more clearly in­
terpreted if discussed within the context of the task re­
quirements of the dependent measures. The first task 
requirement was the MPS, which asked Ss to choose the expres­
sion of feeling which they felt best communicated emotion.
The MPS items were derived from the statements of individuals 
other than those in this study and thus are not personal ex­
pressions of the Ss. When S_s chose test items, they were 
indicating not so much personal preferences as they were 
subjectively choosing the most appropriate expression of 
feeling. The strength of their preference for the appropriate 
expression was indicated by the number of times they chose a 
metaphor in lieu of a literal statement.
Under MPS conditions, intelligence level was demonstrated 
to be the only significant factor involved in a S_* s choice of 
metaphorical or literal items. High IQ Ss preferred metaphor 
significantly more than the low IQ S s , suggesting that recog­
nition of, or perception of, metaphor as an appropriate ex­
pression of feeling is a function of intelligence. The 
Shipley Scale, it will be recalled, is an indicator of in­
tellectual efficiency on two covert dimensions: vocabulary
and analogies. In the subsequent analysis of MPS scores and 
Shipley Vocabulary raw scores, it was suggested that reading 
ability is a salient factor for level I's but not for level
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Ill's. Instead, level III Ss achieved a significant but 
negative correlation between MPS and analogies scores. This 
result may be interpreted as indicative of the approach of 
level III Ss to simple reading tasks. That is, the better 
their ability to solve analogies, the less likely they were 
to select an MPS metaphor, suggesting that the better a level 
III is at understanding solutions to analogies, the more 
critical he becomes of conceptually vague expressions.
Perception of MPS metaphor bore no significant relation­
ship to cognitive style. As stated above, a cognitively com­
plex S does not seem to prefer MPS metaphor, a lack of pref­
erence whidh may be a function of the MPS items themselves. 
That is, they are neither unusually commonplace nor unusually 
poetic. Yet, under the essay task requirements, it was level 
III Ss who produced more metaphorically expressed essays.
This finding suggests that they do indeed discriminate the 
quality of metaphors, since they are able to create their own 
metaphor.
Looking more closely at the Peak Experience Essay task, 
it can be seen that metaphor expression was quantified indi­
rectly by judging the level of transcendence of the experi­
ence. In a more direct manner, each essay was also rated in 
terms of its poetic and metaphoric qualities. The highly 
significant correlation between the two sets of ratings 
suggests that the same process of metaphorization is being 
judged. Thus, cognitive level III Ss are prone toward
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more transcendent peak experiences and more metaphoric ex­
pression than are cognitive level I Ss, Therefore, expres­
sion of metaphor appears to be a function, in general, of the 
stylistic and personality variables which Harvey has inte­
grated into the cognitive style construct.
In summary, the present study suggests that both a com­
plex cognitive style and high level cognitive skills (such 
as analogical reasoning) militate against preference for 
vague and impersonal metaphors created by others. On the 
other hand, it is cognitively complex Ss who excel at creating 
their own metaphors in expression of a transcendent experi­
ence.
The results of this study raise interesting conjectures 
as to the relationship between metaphor expression and per­
ception to different intellectual skills and levels of cogni­
tive complexity. Because a S^ can perceive metaphor as an 
expression of feeling does not imply that he can create meta­
phor in his communications. Likewise, lovers of music and 
poetry are not necessarily skillful at composition.
Specifically, the study suggests that one should use 
several tests of cognitive skills in exploring metaphor 
preference. Possibly, Guilford's (1967) model of intellect 
could be used to relate metaphor preference to a number of 
cognitive operations.
In future research, alternative instruments for obtain­
ing indices of metaphor preference might be considered. For
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example, the peak experience is an event which has taken 
place in the past, but metaphor may be more easily elicited 
by description of one's own immediate, emotional state. It 
is also suggested that future research should address itself 
to expressive measures of metaphor preference since measures 
of metaphor perception, such as the MPS, appear to be con­
founded by the emotionally non-involving nature of such tasks. 
It might also be wise to pursue different ways of determining 
levels of cognitive complexity. For example, Ss could be 
categorized on the basis of level of conceptual abstraction 
rather than level of cognitive complexity.
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY
In the present study, perception of and expression of 
metaphor have been studied within the framework of cognitive 
processes. Metaphor was defined as a conceptual process in 
which two or more ideas are synthesized in such a way as to 
suggest a new concept or image. It was postulated that the 
synthesizing activity requires both skill in cognitive dif­
ferentiation and integration and a cognitive style which 
facilitates experiencing abstract events.
In order to clarify the relation of metaphor perception 
and metaphor expression in the synthesizing process, two 
dependent measures of metaphor preference were devised. Per­
ception of metaphor as an expression of feeling was measured 
by the MPS, a paper-and-pencil task in which a £  chooses 
literal or metaphorical items. Ability to express oneself 
metaphorically was indirectly measured by use of the Peak 
Experience Essay, a task in which the £  writes an account of 
an emotionally significant event.
With two independent variables (intelligence level as 
measured by the Shipley-Hartford Scale and cognitive style as 
measured by Harvey’s This I Believe test) and two dependent 
variables (the MPS and the essay task), the following hypo­
theses were tested.
1. Cognitive level III Ss will score higher on the MPS 
than will cognitive level I Ss.
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2. Higher IQ Ss will score higher on the MPS than will 
lower IQ Ss.
3. There will be an interaction between IQ and cogni­
tive style in S_ performance on the MPS.
H. Ss' scores on the MPS will correlate positively with 
their scores on the Peak Experience Essay.
5. Higher IQ, cognitive level III Ss will demonstrate 
the highest positive correlation between MPS scores and Peak 
Experience Essay ratings.
The results indicated that perception of metaphors as 
expressions of feeling is primarily an input task, possibly 
related to size of vocabulary. In contrast, the ability to 
communicate in metaphor is, within the limits of the sample's 
intellectual level range, primarily a function of the cogni­
tive style construct as explicated in Harvey's Conceptual 
Systems Theory.
It was decided that more information could be gained if 
Shipley-Hartford estimated IQ's were converted back to the 
vocabulary and analogy raw scores and correlated with MPS 
scores. In result, it was found that cognitive level I Ss 
scored higher on the MPS as vocabulary increased, but there 
was no correlation between their MPS and analogies scores.
In contrast, it was found that as level III Ss scored higher 
on the analogies test, they preferred MPS metaphor less.
Yet, it was level III Ss who also wrote the most metaphorical 
essays. It was suggested that level III Ss disliked MPS
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metaphor because of greater ability to discriminate quality 
in metaphoric expressions.
In conclusion, results of the study were used to suggest 
future research. In particular, it was suggested that the 
processes underlying metaphor expression should be given more 
attention and that exploration of the underlying processes 
might include a number of tests of specific cognitive skills 
such as those suggested in Guilford's (1967) model of 
intelligence.
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APPENDIXES
Appendix 1
MPS Test-retest Correlation Coefficients
Positive Metaphor r X Rating SD
"a floating, soaring . . n• .66 4.27 3.13
"A wave of warmth . • . it• .66 5.19 3.61
"I'm in tune with • . . •i• .63 3.81 2.56
"I'm in an ebb and flow . • •i• • . 85 3. 35 3.32
"There's an inner, warm . • it• • .70 5.96 3. 36
"completely wrapped • • ii. .60 5.00 2.42
"My mind expands . . . •it .79 2.58 3.08
"My anticipation stands • • it• • .69 1.96 2.12
"I want to hold back . . • ii• .63 6.23 3.33
"Happiness floods my • • « ii• . 83 4.69 3.37
"A new feeling blossoms • • ii• • .44 4.50 2.78
"There's no separation . « it• • .62 2.85 3.07
Positive Literal
"a general release and . . ." .59 6.15 2.71
"I feel peaceful . . . ." .79 8. 85 2.81
"There's a sense of . . . ." .73 8.27 2.71
"There's a carefree . . . ." .67 7.73 2.77
"I feel very pleased . . . ." .78 7.23 2.29
"I feel excited and . . . ." . 65 8.42 2.37
"I feel self-aware but . . . ." . 80 6.00 3.49
"sure, accomplished, happy . . . ." . 81 8.23 3.14
"There's a lessening of . . . ." .71 7.00 2.80
"I feel more friendly . . . ." .78 8.42 3.33
"slowly becoming aware . . . " .67 7.63 3.21
"I'm keenly aware of . . • ." .76 7. 35 3.55
Negative Metaphor
"The world is a vast . . . ." .68 2.96 2.01
"I'm adrift . . . ." .83 2. 54 1.89
"My heart sinks . . . ." .49 3.62 1.59
"There's a hot, red . . . ." .75 2.65 2.20
"There's an icy . . . ." .92 2.58 2.10
"Everything inside me . . . ."■ . 60 3.31 1.88
"The feeling seizes me . . . ." .79 3.73 1.91
Negative Literal
"My hands and legs are . • • •" .71 2.92 2.37
"I get very, very mad . . . ." .84 3.46 2.56
"I hold my breath . . . ." .61 3.73 1.85
"I feel disappointment . . . ." . 80 5.04 2.08
"I just look at people . . . 





Inside are a number of expressions of emotional experi­
ences which are paired with each other. For each pairing, 
please indicate which item you prefer the most by blacking 
out the letter "a'1 or Mb" on your answer sheet.
Let your preference decisions be based on the following 
criterion: if you were trying to express your emotions to
a close friend, which expression of each pair would you con­
sider the most communicative of meaning?
Please make your judgments on this basis even though 
some of the phrases or sentences may not describe you per­
sonally at this time.
EXAMPLE:
1. a. want to hold back time and capture the moment 
b. I feel sure, accomplished, happy
Of the two expressions, which one would you choose as 
the most communicative of emotional meaning?
When you begin, please work steadily, without taking 
too much time on any one pair of items.
Preference Schedule
completely wrapped up in the moment 
I feel self-aware but not self-conscious.
My hands and legs are cold and yet I sweat.
The world is a vast panorama I ’m viewing from out 
side.
A wave of warmth travels my body, 
a general release and lessening of tension
I just look at people without saying anything.
The world is a vast panorama I ’m viewing from out 
side.
A new feeling blossoms in my mind.
There's a carefree feeling.
My hands and legs are cold and yet I sweat. 
There's an icy burning inside.
completely wrapped up in the moment 
There's a lessening of inner conflict.
I hold my breath and listen intently.
The feeling seizes me, takes over.
There's a carefree feeling, 
completely wrapped up in the moment
The world is a vast panorama I'm viewing from out 
side.
I hold my breath and listen intently.
I feel self-aware but not self-conscious.
A wave of warmth travels my body.
The feeling seizes me, takes over.
I just look at people without saying anything.
There's a carefree feeling.
There is an inner warm glow.
My hands and legs are cold and yet I sweat.
The feeling seizes me, takes over.
There is an inner warm glow.
I feel self-aware but not self-conscious.
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16. a. Everything inside me has stopped.
b. I hold my breath and listen intently.
17. a. a general release and lessening of tension
b. completely wrapped up in the moment
18. a. Everything inside me has stopped,
b. I just look at people without saying anything.
19. a. There’s a lessening of inner conflict,
b. There is an inner warm glow.
20. a. The feeling seizes me, takes over.
b. My hands begin to shake and my stomach trembles.
21. a. There’s a lessening of inner conflict,
b. A new feeling blossoms in my mind,
22. a. My hands begin to shake and my stomach trembles,
b. The world is a vast panorama I ’m viewing from out­
side .
23. a. A new feeling blossoms in my mind.
b. I feel self-aware but not self-conscious.
24. a. My hands and legs are cold and yet I sweat,
b. Everything inside me has stopped.
25. a. There is an inner warm glow.
b. a general release and lessening of tension
26. a. There’s an icy burning inside.
b. I just look at people without saying anything.
27. a. There's a carefree feeling.
b. A wave of warmth travels my body.
28. a. There's an icy burning inside.
b. My hands begin to shake and my stomach trembles.
29. a. There’s a lessening of inner conflict,
b. A wave of warmth travels my body.
30. a. There's an icy burning inside.
b. I hold my breath and listen intently.
31. a. a general release and lessening of tension
b. A new feeling blossoms in my mind.
32. a. Everything inside me has stopped.




In the space below, I would like you to write a brief 
paragraph about an experience in your life which you con­
sider to have been very significant for you.
See if you can recall the most wonderful (meaningful, 
stirring, thrilling, deeply moving, ecstatic, overwhelming) 
experience of your life; when you were deeply touched, 
transported, overjoyed, enraptured, transfixed.
After you have recalled the experience and thought about 
what you want to say, please describe the experience as 
though you wanted to communicate to a friend the experienced 
impact on you: how did it make you feel?
Appendix 4 
Peak Experience Essay Scoring Criteria
Nature of the Experience 
A genuine peak experience.
A very important, meaningful but not quite peak 
experience.
An obviously special event but one which is ex­
perienced by many people.
An event of special meaning, but of pedestrian 
or routine quality.
A trite, banal, ordinary experience.
EXAMPLES
"I first let myself experience myself as I 
really was. This consisted of letting myself be 
held as a little child is held and treated on a 
completely childlike level. The feelings associ­
ated cannot adequately be put into words. Close­
ness, onenessj transcendence, and most of all the 
ambiguous all-encompassing love. It is an ex­
perience I have treasured always and never have 
been able to recapture in quite .the same way."
"I was hiking in the mountains and became 
lost. While searching for my way back, I came 
across a ridge and suddenly before me lay the 
most beautiful valley I have ever seen. A stream 
with falls lay just below me. Birds were singing 
everywhere, and no signs of human existence were 
in evidence for miles around. The anxiety over 
being lost escaped me and was replaced by the 
ethereal quality of having been transported from 
a world of greed and avarice back to a Garden of 
Eden."
"The same type of experience has occurred 
several times and I cannot separate them. They 
were all concerned with music. Both hearing a 
large symphony and singing with a huge group 
brought about these experiences, so the size of 
the group seems important. I felt lifted up and
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a part of the whole group. My only thought was 
that we were doing something great together, and 
nothing else mattered in the world. When the 
symphony was playing, the music has always been 
loud and big. Then I wanted very much to either 
play with them or actively respond in some way."
’'I knew the meaning of the word love versus 
respect. I felt love in a strong but gentle, 
complete sense. I found love to mean one’s 
entire self."
3 "I was a student nurse of pediatric affilia­
tion. A baby, approximately sixteen months old, 
had been critically ill for several days. I 
asked permission to take the child from the bed 
and hold her and this permission was granted. I 
held and rocked the child for several minutes 
before she responded. After a while she began to 
stir and open her eyes and the next day she was 
almost well. It gave me a wonderful feeling to 
think perhaps these few minutes of love and warmth 
to this sick child helped her to get well.”
"The experience that stands out most clearly 
in my mind would have to be termed meaningful and 
deeply moving rather than exciting. The experi­
ence came at the age of nine when I decided to 
follow Christ. That decision has given my life 
meaning and despite doubts and searchings, I have 
never regretted it.”
2 "I left for Paris, France. I was so excited
that I slept very little the last few days before 
leaving. It was a dream-like period. It was 
special because it was a chance to live and study 
abroad and because it offered a chance to travel. 
This was to be a Junior year abroad. It was a 
chance to move into the adult world and meet 
different people."
"I graduated from high school. My mother 
had to quit school early and go to work, but she 
always impressed upon me the value of an education 
and the social atmosphere that would help in 
maturing. Graduation was a milestone--though 
many other experiences rate along with it, perhaps 
it is the most enduring.”
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1 ’’Once when I was playing little league base­
ball, my single in the last inning won the game.
Everyone was happy about it and it made me feel
good to know that I had won the game.”
”1 was about ten years old and my parents and
I went to the beach for a vacation.”
"The sharpest guy I knew asked me out. All 
the other guys I have dated were about average.”
"I joined the Baptist Church. At the time I 
was nine years old and was pleased to realize that 
I could take an active, responsible part in a 
worthwhile organization.”
